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INDIVIDUAL CONSUMPTION RISK AND THE
WELFARE COST OF BUSINESS CYCLES∗
MASSIMILIANO DE SANTIS†

Abstract. This paper measures the welfare gain from removing aggregate consumption
fluctuations starting from an economy in which each individual faces both aggregate and
idiosyncratic income shocks, and incomplete consumption insurance. We show that, because
this welfare gain is a convex function of the overall consumption risk — aggregate plus
idiosyncratic — each individual faces, to gauge the magnitude of the gain, it is important
to match individuals’ overall risk prior to any policy. We also show that the convexity
of the welfare gain function increases substantially if individual consumption risk contains
a realistic random walk component. While being agnostic about how much consumption
risk countercyclical policy can remove, we show that in an economy calibrated to match
individuals’ overall risk, even removing ten percent of aggregate fluctuations results in a
large welfare gain. We also review the previous literature that has found a low gain and
argue that their estimates are low because they unrealistically assume that the idiosyncratic
shocks to income are transitory. With transitory shocks, individuals can come close to perfect
consumption insurance, thus undercutting the need for countercyclical policy.
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1. Introduction
This paper measures the welfare gain from removing aggregate consumption fluctuations in
an economy with idiosyncratic income shocks and incomplete consumption insurance, hence
in an economy where individual risk is substantially greater than per capita risk. In contrast
to previous literature that studied the welfare cost of fluctuations in models with idiosyncratic
shocks, we focus directly on consumption risk rather than income risk. We show that, because
the welfare cost of consumption fluctuations is an increasing and convex function of the overall level of risk that each individual faces, even removing only a small amount of aggregate
fluctuation can lead to a large welfare gain.
A number of papers have attempted to estimate the cost of aggregate fluctuations. The
seminal paper is Lucas (1987) using a representative agent economy. Lucas finds only a
very small welfare improvement in removing aggregate consumption fluctuations of the size
observed in U.S. data. The welfare improvement is equivalent to about one tenth of a percent
of extra consumption at each date during the lifetime of an individual.
Lucas recognized that because of uninsurable idiosyncratic consumption shocks, household
risk is larger than per capita risk (see Lucas 1987, p. 29). His estimate of overall household
consumption risk (aggregate plus idiosyncratic) is three times per capita risk. Removing this
amount of fluctuation would give a welfare gain equal to 6.8% of consumption at each date in
Lucas’ model.1 But Lucas discounts this result because stabilization policies can be expected
to eliminate no more than a small part of the uninsurable risk borne at the individual level.
As Lucas shows, the welfare gain function is convex in the level of risk faced by an individual,
so that a greater fraction of the gain is attributable to removing initial portions of the risk he
faces. This raises a natural question: starting from a higher level of individual risk —because
of missing markets— what would be the gain from removing only aggregate risk? To answer
this question, one needs to model explicitly uninsurable income risk, but given the 6.8% found
in Lucas’ simple calculation, there is potential for a large gain. This brings us to the first
main finding of this paper. When idiosyncratic consumption risk is explicitly incorporated
in a simple model, we show that the welfare gain function is even more convex than Lucas’
function. This implies that removing only aggregate risk results in a much larger welfare gain,
very close to Lucas’ 6.8%.
Where does the increased convexity come from? It comes from assuming permanent idiosyncratic shocks. Lucas (2003) seems to agree on the permanence of such shocks:
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See Lucas 1987, Table 2 with risk aversion equal to 10.
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The fanning out over time of the earnings and consumption distributions within
a cohort that Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson (1994) document is striking
evidence of a sizable uninsurable random walk component in earnings. (p. 10)

A random walk component is crucial to an accurate description of the risk that each individual
faces. Unlike transitory shocks, permanent income shocks cannot be insured away with standard saving technologies. As a consequence, individual consumption will inherit the volatility
of income and, most importantly, the permanent (random walk) component.
Others also have studied the effect of idiosyncratic income shocks and incomplete markets.
But typically, like Lucas, they find that the welfare gain from removing aggregate fluctuations
is low (Imrohoroglu 1989, Krusell and Smith 1999, 2002). We will review these papers in more
detail below, and we will argue that the reason for their low estimates is that their models
do not generate enough volatility and persistence in individual consumption to be consistent
with panel data evidence. In fact, in some cases like Imrohoroglu (1989), individuals have
smoother consumption than Lucas assumed by matching aggregate U.S. consumption growth.
Agents in these models are hit by idiosyncratic income shocks which cannot be fully insured.
But because the shocks are not persistent, agents come close to full insurance by borrowing,
lending, and/or saving. This allows an individual’s consumption to be smoother than his
income, and hence undercuts the need for policy. These papers typically do not check how
much individual consumption fluctuation their models generated.
Because the welfare gain function is highly convex in the level of overall consumption risk,
in quantifying the gain from removing aggregate fluctuations, it is important to match the
overall risk each individual faces in the baseline economy prior to any policy, both in terms
of volatility and persistence. To our knowledge, no one has previously pointed out that the
baseline level of overall risk — aggregate plus idiosyncratic — is important for calculating the
welfare gain from removing a marginal unit of aggregate risk.
One feature that distinguishes our work from almost all the previous literature is the way
we address the question posed by Lucas. It is clear that if policy is to have a positive effect on
welfare, it has to be able to ultimately affect individual consumption risk. But, because there
is no generally accepted theory of how macro policy affects this risk, Lucas focused on a simpler
thought experiment: he asked what the effect on welfare would be if aggregate consumption
variation could be eliminated. Lucas considered one logical possibility, the elimination of
short-lived aggregate consumption shocks around a deterministic trend when agents only face
aggregate risk. We analyze many other possibilities and find that welfare gains are not trivial
in many cases. The analysis of these richer, more realistic, cases does not come at the cost of
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increased complexity. In fact, as in Lucas, the welfare gains under all scenarios have easy to
interpret closed form solutions.
In modeling idiosyncratic risk, we build on the framework of Constantidides and Duffie
(1996). Their main no-trade theorem shows that if idiosyncratic income shocks are permanent,
agents will not find it useful to trade in stocks and bonds to insure against such shocks. So,
idiosyncratic income shocks translate into idiosyncratic consumption shocks. This explains
why, relative to most of the literature, we find a much higher benefit from marginally lowering
individual risk.
Our analysis is based on the assumption that individual shocks contain a martingale component. That this assumption holds empirically was observed in Lillard and Willis’ (1978)
pioneering work. Deaton and Paxson (1994), using panel data from three countries (U.S.,
U.K., and Taiwan), find that earnings and consumption tend to fan out over time within a
cohort, implying the presence of a sizable random walk component in earnings. More recently,
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) document the presence of permanent shocks (martingales) to
earnings in the PSID data. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) also document a pattern of history
dependence in labor market outcomes: when workers are employed in periods of high unemployment, their entry wages are much lower than the wages of workers employed in periods of
lower unemployment, and this difference only disappears slowly over time. Thus, they relate
the persistent component to expansions and recessions. Similarly, Storesletten, Telmer, and
Yaron (2004) show evidence of a significant persistent component to household earnings using
PSID data, which they relate to business cycle variations. They find a negative correlation
over time between cross-sectional earnings means and standard deviations in PSID.
Because this evidence for countercyclical variation is still controversial, our baseline model
will consider the case in which idiosyncratic risk is independent of aggregate risk. The baseline
model shows that even in this case, provided aggregate risk is a random walk, removing only
aggregate risk can result in substantial welfare gains. Thus our conclusion does not hinge
critically on a correlation between the two sorts of risk. We then proceed to show that adding
(what we view as) realistic correlation further increases the welfare gain.
How large the welfare gain from countercyclical policy will be, depends on how much overall
risk one believes such policy can remove. Because it is an open question how much overall
risk can be removed by countercyclical policies, we leave the task of answering this to future
research. Atkeson and Phelan (1994) present a model in which removing aggregate fluctuations leaves overall consumption risk unaltered, thus making policy ineffective. On the other
extreme, Beaudry and Pages (2001) present a model in which eliminating only aggregate productivity shocks also eliminates all idiosyncratic risk. We will be agnostic about this issue, and
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hence will measure the welfare gain under a variety of scenarios for aggregate risk, idiosyncratic risk, and the interactions between the two. We find that there is a region of plausible
parameters for which removing only 10% of U.S. aggregate consumption variation yields a
welfare gain greater than 0.5% of consumption at each date, a level that Lucas (1987) would
have considered large.2 In contrast with some of the literature, we find that if aggregate consumption is a random walk, this large gain does not depend on countercyclical idiosyncratic
risk. We also find that if aggregate risk is correlated with idiosyncratic risk, even removing
short lived consumption shocks around a deterministic trend yields a large welfare gain. We
emphasize that, as in Lucas (1987), our results are based entirely on standard CRRA preferences, which makes our conclusions easy to interpret. It may be that larger gains can be
obtained using Epstein-Zin preferences.3
Section 2 proceeds by performing Lucas’ exercise for several scenarios about the types of
risk and interactions among these. Section 3 relates our results to the existing literature.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Measuring The Cost of Fluctuations
Assume that individuals’ preferences over consumption streams are represented by
#
"∞
X (C i )1−γ
,
E
βt t
1−γ
t=0

where β is a subjective discount factor and γ is the relative risk aversion coefficient.
Suppose further that the log of individual consumption, ln Cti , is the sum of an aggregate
plus an idiosyncratic stochastic process, that is:
(1)

ln Cti = ln Ct + ln δti ,

where Ct is per-capita consumption, and δti is an idiosyncratic shock. In particular, δti is given
by the martingale
δti = exp

( t 
X
s=1

y2
ηsi ys − s
2

)

,

where ys , s = 1, . . . , t, is the cross sectional standard deviation of consumption growth at
time s, known at time t, and ηsi are idiosyncratic shocks, assumed to have a standard normal
N (0, 1) distribution.4 To see that yt is the cross sectional standard deviation of consumption
2

On page 29 Lucas says that “...something like one-half of 1 percent of total consumption. As deadweight
losses go, this is a large number.”
3
See Lucas (2003) for a perspective on the use of this preference structure, and Bansal and Yaron (2004) for
a model with Epstein-Zin preferences that stresses long run risks.
4Recall that for η normal E[exp(ηk − (k 2 /2))] = 1, which implies that δ i is a geometric martingale.
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growth at time t, consider individual consumption growth between t − 1 and t:
1
Ct
Cti
δti Ct
= exp{ηti yt − yt2 }
.
=
i
i
2
Ct−1
Ct−1
δt−1 Ct−1
Therefore conditioning on Ct ,
 
yt2 = Var log

Cti /Ct
i
Ct−1 /Ct−1



,

i.e., yt2 is the cross sectional variance of consumption growth. To fix ideas, it is useful to
think about individual consumption as if the aggregates (Ct , yt2 ) are determined first, then the
idiosyncratic shocks ηti are handed out.
The individual consumption process in (1) can be derived as an equilibrium consumption
process in a standard finance economy, which is the essence of Constantinides and Duffie’s
theorem (1996). Appendix A briefly describes such a model. The Appendix also shows
that both asset prices and the welfare cost of consumption fluctuations only depend on the
stochastic behavior of Ct and yt2 .5
To be able to calibrate the model and provide quantitative answers to our specific questions,
we need to add to the Constantinides and Duffie framework assumptions about the stochastic
process for Ct and yt2 . We now provide a specification of the stochastic process that is simple
enough to yield a closed form solution to the welfare gain from reducing aggregate fluctuations.
Let gt+1 = ∆ ln Ct+1 . The process for gt , yt is as follows:
(2)

gt+1 = µ + σηt+1
2
yt+1
= y 2 + bσηt+1 + σu ut+1 ,

where the aggregate shock ηt+1 is assumed to be i.i.d. with normal distribution N (0, 1). Hence
σ is the standard deviation (volatility) of consumption growth, and aggregate consumption
follows a geometric random walk. The shock ut+1 is assumed to be i.i.d. with normal distribution N (0, 1), and the parameter b allows for a correlation between the innovation to per
2 . If b = 0,
capita consumption growth and and the variance of the idiosyncratic shock yt+1

the two processes are independent; we will focus on this case initially, then move to the more
realistic case where b 6= 0, calibrating b to existing empirical evidence.
The assumption that per capita consumption follows a random walk with drift is not innocuous in this context as we will see below, but it is a convenient starting point for our
analysis of the cost of consumption fluctuations. A theoretical reason for this assumption is
offered by Robert Hall (1978), and the presence of a unit root in per capita consumption is
consistent with U.S. data. Further, the assumption is almost universal in the consumption
5See also Section 2.1 and Appendix B.
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based asset pricing literature.6 A contrasting assumption, considered by Lucas (1987), will be
addressed in Section 2.6 below.
2.1. Measuring the Welfare Gain.
To compute Lucas’ measure in this economy, we need to calculate the value of ∆ such that
"∞
#
"∞
#
X
X
t
i 1−γ
t
i 1−γ
,
β (C̄t )
= E0
β [(1 + ∆)Ct ]
(3)
E0
t=0

t=0

where

{Cti }

is the consumption stream in the economy with aggregate fluctuations, and {C̄ti }

is the consumption stream in the economy without aggregate fluctuations. By an economy
without aggregate fluctuations in this case we mean an economy in which aggregate consumption growth equals expected consumption growth in the economy with aggregate fluctuations.
1

2

That is, C̄t+1 /C̄t = eµ+ 2 σ with probability one, where C̄ denotes aggregate consumption in
the economy without aggregate shocks ηt . In contrast with Lucas’ benchmark in which there is
only aggregate risk, this is still a risky economy because agents remain subject to uninsurable
idiosyncratic income shocks.
We can calculate the two expected utilities in (3). Consider the left side first. Multiplying
and dividing by (C0i )1−γ yields
#
"∞
 i 1−γ
∞
X
X
t Ct
i
1−γ
t
i 1−γ
E0 β
= [C0 (1 + ∆)]
β [(1 + ∆)Ct ]
E0
.
C0i
t=0
t=0

In Appendix B we show that

[C0i (1 + ∆)]1−γ

∞
X

E0 β t

t=0

where
(4)

A ≡ A(θ) ≡ β exp



Cti
C0i

1−γ

=

[C0i (1 + ∆)]1−γ
,
1−A




 1
1
(1 − γ)µ + αy 2 + [(1 − γ)σ + αbσ]2 + α2 σu2
2
2

with α = 12 γ(γ − 1) and θ = (β, γ, µ, σ, y 2 , b, σu ).

For the economy without aggregate fluctuations (the right side of (3)), the same calculations
can be performed, with the assumption that ηt = 0 with probability one. The right side will
then become:
(C0i )1−γ

∞
X
t=0

E0 β

t



C̄ti
C0i

1−γ

=

(C0i )1−γ
,
1 − A′

6For a recent empirical analysis of aggregate consumption, see Ricardo Reis (2005). The data does not reject

a unit root, although it rejects the random walk model in favor of a model in which consumption growth is
positively serially correlated. This would increase our welfare gain. Krebs (2003) is an example of a production
economy in which per capita consumption is a random walk in equilibrium.
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where
(5)



1 2
1 2 2
2
A ≡ A(θ ) ≡ β exp (1 − γ)(µ + σ ) + αy + α σu
2
2
′

′

and θ′ = (β, γ, µ, σu , σ).7 Therefore, assuming both A and A′ are less than unity, ∆ is the
solution to

[C0i (1 + ∆)]1−γ 1
(C i )1−γ 1
= 0
.
1−γ
1−A
1 − γ 1 − A′
So, ∆ as a function of the parameters θ is given by

 1
1 − A′ γ−1
− 1.
(6)
∆(θ) =
1−A

Notice that γ > 1 implies A > A′ , hence ∆ > 0, i.e., the economy without aggregate fluctuations is strictly preferred.8
To begin, consider the special case in which b = 0 and σu = 0, so that the cross sectional
dispersion yt2 is constant and equal to y 2 . Here, agents still face idiosyncratic shocks, but the
shocks come from a constant distribution with variance y 2 . In this special case,



 1
2 2
2
A = β exp (1 − γ)µ + αy + (1 − γ) σ .
2

The convexity of the welfare gain in overall risk should now become clear. Notice that A is
increasing in both y and σ. Consequently, when the variability of η is removed, the percentage
change in utility (as A changes to A′ ) will be larger when y and σ are larger. How important
this convexity effect is for the magnitude of the gain depends on the parameters in θ and θ′ ,
which we estimate below. If either b < 0, σu > 0, or both, the welfare gain from removing
fluctuations will be strictly greater than in this special case.
2.2. Benchmark Calibration.
Table 1 presents the chosen parameters in θ. The mean and the standard deviation of percapita consumption growth, µ and σ, match the BEA data on real per capita consumption of
non-durables and services for the period 1929-1998.
Our benchmark value for y 2 is well below the cross sectional variation reported in Carrol
(1992) or Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001). In his studies of precautionary saving,
Carrol (1992, 1997) uses a level of 10% for the standard deviation of permanent shocks to
income, after accounting for measurement error in PSID data.9 We choose this value as our
7The presence of σ 2 in the formula for A′ comes from the fact that in removing aggregate fluctuations, we

equate consumption growth to mean growth in the economy with aggregate shocks, which depends on σ 2 .
8The parameterizations chosen in our calibration exercises below imply that both A and A′ are less than
one.
9Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron calibrate their model so that the cross sectional variance of consumption
growth is 0.029, i.e. a standard deviation of 17%.
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Table 1. Parameter Choices
Parameter

Symbol

Value

Mean consumption growth (%)

µ

1.89

Standard deviation of consunption growth (%)

σ

2.9

Mean idiosyncratic shock (%)

y2

(10%)2

Std. Dev. idiosyncratic shock

σu

0.00389

Covariation with aggregate risk

b

0

Risk aversion

γ

2,4

Implied log risk-free rate (%)

rf

1.4

Subjective discount factor∗

β

0.99, 0.95

*The subjective discount factor β is calculated so that we match a risk-free rate of 1.4%, given other
parameters.

benchmark level, and we pair it with low values of risk aversion that many economists would
agree on, i.e., γ = 2 and 4.
The benchmark value of σu , which represents the amount of variation in yt2 , are chosen
so that with 99% probability the cross sectional variance yt2 lies between zero (absence of
heterogeneity) and 2 y 2 . When y 2 = 0.01, this means that Prob(0 ≤ yt2 ≤ 0.02) = 0.99.
Stated in terms of cross sectional standard deviation, this implies that with 99% probability
the cross-sectional standard deviation of consumption growth will be between 0 and 14%.
Notice that modeling the variance (yt2 ) as normally distributed, as opposed to the standard
deviation (yt ), reduces the probability mass of values of yt far from the mean y. In our example
with y 2 = 0.01, Prob(0 ≤ yt ≤ 0.10) = Prob(0.10 ≤ yt ≤ 0.14) = 0.499. All these values are
consistent with CEX data and are lower than the magnitudes assumed in Soresletten, Telmer
and Yaron (2001).
The only parameter left to calibrate is β. In all cases, we chose the parameter β so that the
model matches a risk free rate of 1.4%, a value consistent with time series data on the U.S.
three month T-bill. Our assumption of log-normality for Ct and yt2 implies that the log risk
f
free rate rt+1
, known at time t, is given by
f
rt+1
=

(7)

1
ebσ)2 + α
e2 σu2 ,
−e
αy 2 − (σγ − α
2
|
{z
}
intertemporal substitution
− ln β + γµ
{z
}
|

precautionary saving

f
with α
e = 0.5γ(γ + 1). By contrast, notice that in Lucas’ economy rt+1
= − ln β + γµ −

γ 2 σ2
2 .

Since σ is only about 3%, σ 2 is very small. So, even with high risk aversion, the precautionary
saving term

γ 2 σ2
2

is second order, implying an unrealistically large risk free rate when γ is
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large (the risk free rate puzzle). In our economy, at least within a range of plausible values,
the risk free rate is decreasing in risk aversion, i.e. the precautionary saving motive is not
second order.
2.3. Results.
We perform the welfare calculations presented above for our chosen benchmark parameterizations. Table 2 presents the results. In the left panel, we vary the relative risk aversion
γ between 2 and 4, adjusting β to match the low risk free interest rate as described above.
Welfare gains are large, 5.1% and 4.2% when γ is 2 and 4 respectively (see row ∆100% ).
Table 2. Welfare Gain from Removing Consumption Fluctuations
Welfare Measure γ = 2 γ = 4 γ = 2 γ = 4
rf = 1.4%

β = 0.96

∆100%

0.051

0.042

0.017

0.047

∆70%

0.046

0.038

0.015

0.043

∆50%

0.038

0.031

0.012

0.035

∆30%

0.026

0.022

0.008

0.024

∆10%

0.010

0.008

0.003

0.009

Notes: γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, rf the risk free interest
rate, β the subjective discount factor. In the left panel, pairings of (γ, β) are
chosen to match a risk free rate of 1.4%. The right panel presents results for
β = 0.96 and changing risk aversion. ∆X% means that only X% of variation
in ηt is removed.

These results differ from Lucas in two respects: (i) the inclusion of idiosyncratic risk, and
(ii) the assumption that aggregate consumption follows a random walk rather than being
trend-stationary. While our main interest is in (i), let us first focus on (ii). U.S. data confirms
that aggregate consumption is almost a random walk, and not trend-stationary, so shocks to
aggregate consumption have a permanent effect. How much of the large gain is due to (ii)?
This can be calculated by setting y 2 = 0 in our formula for ∆. For γ = 4, the gain would be
1.6% if policy could eliminate the random walk in aggregate consumption, even in an economy
without idiosyncratic risk.
However, as Lucas pointed out, eliminating all aggregate variation should be regarded as an
upper bound; it is hard to imagine that policy could eliminate all such variation. This skepticism seems all the more warranted when aggregate consumption is a random walk rather than
trend-stationary (although there are models in the literature in which policy is so powerful).
This motivates considering scenarios in which macro policy can only remove some fraction of
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aggregate variation. Rows denoted by ∆X% signify that only X% of variation in ηt is removed.
With a risk aversion coefficient γ = 2 and cross sectional variance yt2 = 0, we obtain a welfare
gain of 0.3% if policy can remove only 10% of the variation in aggregate consumption risk and
there is no idiosyncratic risk ; a relatively small number. This sets the stage for (i). As the
table shows, the presence of idiosyncratic risk more than triples the welfare gain to 1% (see
row ∆10% ). This is more than ten times larger than in Lucas’ analysis with only aggregate
risk and γ = 10.
The large welfare gain arises from the convexity of the welfare gain function. The presence
of idiosyncratic risk leads each individual to face more total risk in the absence of policy.
Hence any marginal decrease in total risk yields a substantially larger welfare gain. Similar
results are obtained in the right panel of the Table, where we fix β to the commonly assumed
value of 0.96, and vary risk aversion from 2 to 4.10
It is important to notice that the high welfare gain in Table 2 does not depend on the correlation between aggregate shocks and the cross sectional standard deviation of consumption
growth, i.e. the parameter b = 0. We will see below that, once we realistically set b < 0,
the welfare gain from removing even 10% of aggregate variability will be larger yet, in accord
with the convexity of the welfare gain function. As pointed out in Section 2.1, even if b = 0,
the welfare gain from removing variation in ηt increases with y. It is of interest to contrast
this implication for the welfare gain with the implication of idiosyncratic risk for the equity
premium; the presence of idiosyncratic risk can help explain the high equity premium only if
the dispersion of idiosyncratic risk is countercyclical (see Mankiw 1986, and Constantinides
and Duffie 1996).
Appendix C presents additional estimates of the welfare gain from a parameterization of the
model that meets some minimal requirement for consistency with stock market observations.
The results are similar to the benchmark calculations.11

2.4. Effect of Cyclical Variation in Idiosyncratic Risk.
To evaluate the effect of the correlation between aggregate shocks ηt and the cross sectional
variance of the idiosyncratic shock y 2 , we calculate the welfare gain assuming b < 0: negative
aggregate shocks are, on average, accompanied by greater cross sectional heterogeneity in
consumption growth. The empirical evidence for significant negative correlation (b < 0) is
found in Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004). The

µ+0.5σ 2
10In all cases, the mean of consumption growth is kept constant, E (C
.
t
t+1 /Ct ) = e
11The minimal requirement is that the model matches the Sharpe ratio on the S&P 500.
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models of Soresletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001) and Krebs (2003) underscore the importance
of the correlation for large welfare gains.12
Table 3. Effect of Cyclical Variation in Idiosyncratic Risk on the Welfare Gain
Welfare Measure γ = 2 γ = 4 γ = 2 γ = 4
b = −0.13

b = −0.81

∆100%

0.056

0.055

0.081

0.110

∆70%

0.051

0.050

0.074

0.101

∆50%

0.042

0.042

0.061

0.085

∆30%

0.029

0.029

0.041

0.059

∆10%

0.011

0.011

0.015

0.023

Notes: γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, b the regression coefficient
of yt2 on gt . In all cases the subjective discount factor β is chosen to match a
risk free rate of 1.4%. ∆X% means that only X% of variation in ηt is removed.

We calibrate b in two ways. A simple way is to assume that all the variation in yt2 (equal
to σu in the benchmark model) depends on the aggregate shock ηt ,
2
yt+1
= y 2 + bσηt+1 ,

and set b = −σu /σ, where the value of σu is taken from Table 2. This generates a value of
b = −0.13. Results from this exercise are presented on the left panel of Table 3.
We can also get a rough measure of b from the empirical literature cited above. Using NBER
business cycle dates and BEA per capita consumption data 1929-2005, consumption growth
is about 2.9% during expansions, and -0.8% during contractions. Using the same NBER
indicator, Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) finds that yt2 is (21%)2 during expansions
and (12%)2 during contractions. Their estimates thus imply a value of b = −0.81. The right
panel of Table 3 presents the results.
Relative to the results of Table 2 the welfare gain does not increase much for b = −0.13,
but increases substantially if b = −0.81.
2.5. Why is the Potential Gain so High?
Figure 1 summarizes our findings by plotting the welfare gain ∆ as a function of σ for different
values of y 2 and b. The Figure allows us to identify the relative contribution of each main
12Krebs (2005) points out that the results in Storesletten et al. (2001) and in Krebs (2003) may be biased

upward because they used estimates from the working paper version of Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004).
The latter authors revised their estimates of the parameter b downward in the published version of their paper.
Our calibration is not subject to this criticism.
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Figure 1. Individual Risk and Welfare Gains
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The function ∆(θ) is calculated from the definition of ∆(θ) in the body of the paper for γ = 4,
β = 0.96, and other parameters as in the benchmark model. 21 γσ 2 is Lucas’ welfare gain function.
∆(y 2 = 0) indicates absence of heterogeneity, and ∆(y 2 = 0.12 ) is the benchmark model of Table 2.
The case ∆(y 2 = 0.12 , b = −0.3) introduces some correlation between aggregate and idiosyncratic
risk.

component of individual risk: the random walk in aggregate consumption, the level of idiosyncratic risk y 2 , and the degree to which idiosyncratic risk depends on aggregate risk—the
coefficient b. With a random walk in per capita consumption, the welfare gain ∆ is already
more convex in σ than with Lucas’ trend stationary process, even when there is no cross
sectional heterogeneity (see curve ∆(y 2 = 0, b = 0)). But notice the increase in convexity as
y 2 increases, illustrated by curve ∆(y 2 = 0.102 , b = 0). This is why removing only 10% of
aggregate fluctuation yields a large welfare gain, as seen in Table 2. Finally, taking account
of the fact that shocks to per capita consumption growth are correlated to the permanent
idiosyncratic shock (b < 0), convexity increases further, leading to an even larger welfare gain.
The Figure makes clear how crucial it is to properly characterize an individual’s total risk
prior to any policy, in order to correctly evaluate the welfare gain from marginally removing
some aggregate risk. Removing 10% of aggregate risk is given by the change in σ between the
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two vertical dashed lines in the Figure (from right to left). The double arrows to the right
show the welfare gain from removing the 10% in each case. The gain is highest (2.6%) if, in
addition to idiosyncratic risk, we assume a realistic value of b.
2.6. Mean Reverting Shocks to Aggregate Consumption.
The results above rest on the assumption that per capita consumption follows a random walk
with drift. Because of the nature of this process, removing aggregate shocks amounts to
removing transitory shocks to per capita consumption growth, but permanent shocks to the
level of per capita consumption.
It is worth emphasizing that, like Lucas (1987), we are not describing policies that would
remove aggregate risk, but only evaluating the consequences. In this spirit, and because U.S.
per capita consumption is very close to a random walk, the scenarios illustrated in Figure 1 are
interesting and informative, emphasizing our theme that, in order to accurately evaluate any
business cycle policy, it is crucial to first match the level of overall risk faced by individuals
prior to policy.
One could take the rather pessimistic view that stabilization policy can only remove consumption shocks that are short-lived. How large is the gain from removing shocks of this type?
To answer this question, let us take the extreme view that macro policy can only remove aggregate shocks that last one period. That is, assume aggregate consumption in the absence of
policy would follow a trend stationary process with i.i.d. shocks:
(8)

ln Ct = δ + µt + σηt .

The essence of this process is that if log consumption is hit by a negative shock ηt , it will revert
to the linear trend at t + 1 if there were no subsequent shocks. This means that consumption
growth between t and t + 1 will be greater than average to bring consumption back to trend,
i.e, consumption growth is strongly negatively correlated. This is not an accurate description
of U.S. consumption growth data, which is positively rather than negatively correlated. But
it is a convenient shortcut to analyze the welfare gain from removing very short lived cyclical
shocks. This seems to be the path taken in Lucas (1987).
With yt2 specified as in (2), the welfare gain in this special case is


 1

1 − A′T γ−1
1 2
2
exp
(9)
∆T =
σ γ − αbσ − 1,
1 − AT
2

where

1
AT ≡ β exp{(1 − γ)µ + αy 2 + α2 (b2 σ 2 + σu2 )} and
2
1
A′T ≡ β exp{(1 − γ)µ + αy 2 + α2 σu2 }.
2
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The subscript “T” stands for “trend stationary.” Apart from a proportionality constant, (AT )t
is the tth element of the utility function in the economy with trend stationary aggregate shocks,
and (A′T )t is the tth element in the economy without such shocks.
Notice from the presence of b2 σ 2 in the formula for AT that, even if aggregate risk is small
and short lived, it has a long lasting effect through its correlation with idiosyncratic risk b.
Thus a transitory shock to aggregate consumption is converted into a permanent shock at the
individual level.
For reasonable levels of b, the welfare gain is substantial even if policy can remove only
these one-period self-adjusting shocks, as Table 4 shows. If b = −0.81 (the value of b found by
Storesletten et al.), the gain is 1.4% and 4.1% when γ is 2 and 4, respectively. For the U.S.,
this corresponds to a per capita gain in 2004 dollars of $386 and $1,130, respectively. Even
if b is set to the conservative value of −0.13, the gain is one order of magnitude larger than
Lucas’. With risk aversion γ = 4, the gain is 0.043%, which corresponds to about $119 per
capita in 2004 dollars, and about $35 billion in aggregate.
Table 4. Welfare Gain When Aggregate Consumption is Trend Stationary
Welfare Gain ∆T
γ=2

γ=4

b = −0.13

0.14% 0.43%

b = −0.81

1.4%

4.1%

Notes: γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, b the regression coefficient
of yt2 on gt . In all cases the subjective discount factor β is chosen to match a
risk free rate of 1.4%.

Notice from the welfare formula above that, in the special case b = 0, the factors AT and
A′T

are equal, and hence the welfare gain from removing business cycles equals
1

∆T = e 2 σ

2γ

− 1,

which is exactly Lucas’ result. In this special case, not only is aggregate risk predictable and
short lived, but also has no effect on idiosyncratic risk. Theoretically, it is an interesting
special case of the model, but it is hardly realistic since it assumes the substantial permanent
shocks at the individual level are completely unrelated to recessions and expansions.
The effect of y 2 and b on ∆T is shown in Figure 2. For any given b < 0, the convexity
of the welfare gain function increases with y 2 ; and potential welfare gains are very high: see
curves ∆T (y 2 = .102 , b = −.3) and ∆T (y 2 = .122 , b = −.3). The convexity of the welfare
function ∆T also increases substantially with the absolute value of b as illustrated by the
curve ∆T (y = .102 , b = −0.5).
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Figure 2. Welfare Gains with Trend Stationary Per Capita Consumption
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The function ∆T (θ) is calculated from the definition of ∆T (θ) in the body of the paper for γ = 4,
β = 0.96, and other parameters as in the benchmark model. 12 γσ 2 is Lucas’ welfare gain function,
which obtains if b = 0. The case ∆T (y 2 = 0.12 , b = −0.3) introduces some correlation between
aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. Relative to this case, the two higher curves correspond to higher
|b|, b = −0.5, and higher heterogeneity, y 2 = 0.122 , respectively.

3. Discussion and Relation to Existing Literature
In this section we review some of the previous literature that studied the welfare cost of
business cycles in the context of incomplete consumption insurance. We want to make two
basic points. First, in most of the literature, the idiosyncratic income shocks are not persistent.
Consequently, individuals can insure themselves by using storage or saving, instruments which
allow them to come pretty close to complete insurance. Indeed, in some cases, the level of
consumption risk faced by each individual in equilibrium is lower than the per-capita risk
assumed by Lucas. This is counterfactual since panel data shows large permanent shocks and
significant consumption risk. This point explains why most of the previous literature finds a
low welfare gain from removing aggregate fluctuations. As we have seen in both Figures 1
and 2, the size of the gain depends crucially on the level of risk faced by each individual in
the benchmark economy without policy, not just on the amount of risk policy can remove.
If individuals face only a small amount of risk even without policy — because they have
self-insured — naturally macro policy can only contribute a small additional benefit.
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The second point is, even granted that individuals face significant consumption risk in
the absence of macro policy, it remains an open question how effective macro policy can be in
reducing their risk. Atkeson and Phelan (1994) present a model in which eliminating aggregate
fluctuations does not alter individual risk at all. On the other extreme, Beaudry and Pages
(2001) present a model in which aggregate fluctuations are at the heart of individual risk.
Hence, removing the business cycle eliminates individual risk completely. This is why, in our
simulations, we considered multiple scenarios.
A paper that illustrates the first point is Imrohoroglu (1989). Her work was directly motivated by the fact that individuals face incomplete insurance markets and cannot perfectly
insure against idiosyncratic risk. Thus she departed from Lucas’ representative agent model.
But, even allowing for idiosyncratic shocks, Imrohoroglu finds very low welfare gains from
removing aggregate fluctuations. Indeed, in some cases she considers, the welfare gain is even
smaller than Lucas’ estimate. Although each individual is hit by only partially insurable income shocks, she includes a storage technology and costly borrowing in her model, instruments
which permit each individual to smooth his consumption more than in Lucas’ model, effectively eliminating the need for countercyclical policy. The reason individuals in Imrohoroglu’s
model can reach a high level of consumption insurance using storage and costly borrowing is
that her shocks to income are transitory. In terms of our Figures, in Imrohoroglu’s model,
prior to any policy, agents move to a low welfare gain function by self insuring —recall that
decreasing individual risk results in a lower, less convex ∆. Thus, Imrohoroglu’s gain calculations can be thought of as involving a movement along the lower curve in Figure 1 on the
very flat section close to the origin.13
The papers of Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002) also illustrate our first point. They argue,
while it is plausible that the average gain for the typical household is low, removing fluctuations may be very beneficial for some fraction of the population. Therefore, they study
the distribution of welfare gains from removing fluctuations across a population consisting of
infinitely lived agents affected by three shocks: an aggregate productivity shock, an idiosyncratic income shock (the loss of a job), and an idiosyncratic preference shock that affects the
subjective discount factor. Both aggregate shocks and idiosyncratic shocks to income are transitory. Individuals have access to a saving technology that converts one unit of consumption
into one unit of capital and pays the aggregate marginal product of capital. In equilibrium,
patient agents save more than impatient ones. But, because income shocks for the most part
are transitory, all agents find it optimal to use the saving technology, thus smoothing consumption. With different wealth levels, the welfare gain from removing the business cycle
13In fact, the gain she finds is so low that it must be the case that agents can also insure some of the

aggregate shocks before policy.
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will differ across the population. Krusell and Smith find that an unborn agent is better off in
the economy without business cycles, but the gain is very small, 0.14%. This value does not
capture distributional effects; so Krusell and Smith also calculate welfare gains for agents with
different wealth levels and employment status, by evaluating the change in utility resulting
from transitioning to a new steady state without aggregate fluctuations. They find that for
most groups the welfare gains are negative.
Why are the gains in Krusell and Smith so low? In both economies they consider, a
cyclical economy without policy and a non-cyclical economy with policy, agents save to self
insure against idiosyncratic shocks. Thus most likely, as in Imrohoroglu, Krusell and Smith
find that the gain from removing the business cycle is so low because most individuals have
already self-insured. In terms of our Figure 1, prior to any policy, by self insuring against
idiosyncratic shocks, agents move to a lower welfare gain function. They also insure against
the aggregate shock, thus moving to a flatter portion towards the origin.14 Thus, removing
aggregate variation only results in very small gains.
We now turn to the second point that emerges from the literature, that it is an open question
how effective macro policy can be in reducing individual risk.
Atkeson and Phelan (1994) argue that the welfare gain from removing aggregate risk is
zero, regardless of how much individual risk agents face, because removing aggregate risk
leaves individual risk unaltered. Thus, even if an individual finds himself on the steep portion
of a highly convex welfare gain function, removing aggregate fluctuations will not change his
position on the curve, because aggregate risk is replaced by higher idiosyncratic risk, and
hence will not benefit him at all. Atkenson and Phelan construct a simple model in which this
can be the case: Suppose the aggregate state can assume two values, high or low, and that
the state determines only the probability of becoming unemployed. If aggregate fluctuations
are removed, and as a result the unemployment rate equals the mean unemployment rate of
the economy with aggregate fluctuations, on average agents lose their jobs as many times as
before. So their ex-ante income streams are the same in both cases, and removing aggregate
shocks does not yield any welfare gain.
On the other extreme, Beaudry and Pages (2001) show that removing aggregate risk can
completely remove individual risk.15 In their model, because workers lack the ability to commit
to a firm, aggregate risk causes firms to offer wage contracts that are downwardly rigid — to
insure risk averse agents against downward risk, and upwardly flexible — to keep agents from
quitting in expansions when labor markets are tight. Because the wage is downward rigid, a
14This can be deduced from the saving behavior before and after removing aggregate fluctuations in Krussel

and Smith’s economy.
15This situation, in which y 2 = 0, is even more extreme than the scenarios we considered.
t
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laid off worker who re-enters the labor force with a lower wage contract will have lower wages
than if he had not been laid off. Thus negative wage shocks are persistent.16 On the other hand,
without aggregate productivity shocks, at equilibrium firms would offer a constant wage, and
agents would choose to allocate their labor between firms and a home technology to equalize
their marginal product in the two sectors (in terms of consumption units), thus completely
eliminating income risk. Hence, in this economy, removing aggregate fluctuations removes
the persistent consumption risk completely. Although an individual employed by a firm may
become unemployed because of a re-allocation shock, the firm pays him the consumption value
of his marginal product in the household sector, therefore the individual is indifferent about
losing his job.
Two papers in the literature that are very close to ours are Storesletten, Telmer, and
Yaron (2001) and Krebs (2003). In Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001), agents live finite
lives and are hit by age specific earning shocks which, at least in part, are highly persistent.
The aggregate shock determines the variance of the persistent component of the age specific
shocks: the variance is higher with low realizations of the aggregate shock (b < 0). In their
model, removing the aggregate shock means (i) the aggregate shock is set to its unconditional
mean, and (ii) the variance of individual shocks is made independent of aggregate shocks,
thus reducing individual risk further. Their age specific income process does not contain a
random walk, but it does have persistence. In terms of the scenarios we analyzed, their model
is closest to the benchmark model with per capita consumption being a random walk.
Krebs (2003) extends the infinite horizon Constantinides and Duffie (1996) framework to
include production. Agents face individual specific martingale shocks as in our case, and
economy-wide technology shocks that are correlated with aggregate shocks. Thus, removing
aggregate shocks also eliminates the cyclicality of the cross sectional dispersion yt2 . Krebs’
model implies that, in equilibrium, per capita consumption follows approximately a random
walk. Thus, as in Storesletten et al., removing aggregate fluctuations removes persistent shocks
to per capita consumption.17
One difference between the above two models and ours is that they focus exclusively on
the correlation between aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. We have shown that when per
capita consumption follows a random walk (or close to it), b < 0 is not necessary for large
welfare gains. Nevertheless the case b < 0 is more realistic; hence we view their analyses as
basically complementary to ours. The important difference lies in the level of complexity:
16

This seems to be consistent with the evidence in Bils (1985), and Beaudry and DiNardo (1991, 1995).

17Krebs 2005 is another interesting example of how a reduction of individual risk from removing business

cycles could come about. The paper focuses on welfare gains from removing cyclical variation in the long-term
earning losses of displaced workers.
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their models are much more complex, and hence what drives their conclusions is much less
transparent. Like Lucas’, our model can be solved analytically, while their models cannot,
requiring numerical solution procedures. So, even the large welfare gains that they find are
hard to interpret. Unlike our Figure 1, there is no simple, convex welfare gain function that
they can point to. A fortiori, they cannot compare their conclusions with Lucas’ by saying
that, once individual risk is explicitly modelled by including a random walk component to
individual earnings, the welfare gain function becomes much more convex, hence the gain
from policy becomes much larger.
It is worth amplifying on this important difference, which also applies to most of the other
papers in the literature. We have addressed Lucas’ question by focusing directly on the
consumption process; by contrast, the cited literature analyzes production economies. The
latter approach is useful to get a concrete feeling of how changes in individual risk could
come about. But it also requires assumptions about the workings of a production economy,
and hence adds complexity, which forecloses the possibility of simple closed-form solution and
analysis.
To summarize, what we learn from extant literature is that when shocks to income are only
transitory, individuals can reduce consumption risk using simple storage or saving technologies.
This makes any macro policy that would further reduce aggregate risk almost unnecessary. But
this is counterfactual since panel data reveals a high level of cross sectional consumption risk,
and the presence of a sizable random walk component to individual earnings and consumption.
Lucas’ argument for considering idiosyncratic risk is that individual risk should be greater than
per capita risk because of incomplete markets, not lower. Where the persistent and uninsurable
shocks come from we do not know at this time, although Beaudry and Pages offer one story.
Even accepting the presence of high consumption risk and a sizable random walk component
to earnings shocks, we still cannot say how much of this risk aggregate policy can remove.
Given the contrary examples in Atkeson and Phelan and in Beaudry and Pages, the plausible
thing to do is to consider multiple scenarios.
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we show that, to evaluate the welfare gain from removing aggregate fluctuations, it is essential for a good model to first replicate the actual consumption risk that
individuals face in the absence of any policy.
Aggregate consumption data follows nearly a random walk; further, panel data shows there
is a sizable individual-specific random walk to income. Accordingly, we have constructed a
simple endowment economy that incorporates these features. The model is consistent with
the high and persistent consumption risk observed in panel data. Also, in contrast to Lucas’,
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our model is consistent with the market price of risk (maximal Sharpe ratio) implied by the
stock market and with a low risk free rate. As in Lucas, the model is kept at the simplest
level, so it yields a closed form solution to the welfare gain from removing aggregate risk.
Unlike Lucas, we find that the welfare gain from removing aggregate risk is large. The main
reason is that, with CRRA preferences, this welfare gain is a convex function of the overall risk
that each individual faces. Since individual risk is larger than per capita risk, we find that
the gain from removing only aggregate fluctuations is two orders of magnitude larger than
in Lucas’ exercise. The welfare gain is large if policy can remove only 10% of unpredictable
shocks to per capita consumption growth, independent of the correlation between aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks. The welfare gain also is large if policy can only remove short-lived
shocks, provided these shocks are related to individuals’ idiosyncratic income shocks.
Lucas suggested that we consider seriously his estimates as an upper bound to the “...
marginal social product of additional advances in business cycle theory” (1987, p. 27). If
Lucas had used a simple model that included persistent uninsurable shocks to income, he
possibly would have reached a very different conclusion. Our analysis suggests that additional
advances in business cycle theory may have a large return.
Using a non-parametric model, in the sense that it abstracts from the utility maximization
problem of agents, and focusing on asset pricing observations such as the Sharpe ratio, Alvarez and Jermann (2004) also find high costs to consumption fluctuations. But Alvarez and
Jermann conclude that removing business cycles would only lead to small welfare improvements. This is because they estimate that only a small fraction of fluctuations in aggregate
consumption comes from business cycles frequencies. Alvarez and Jermann’s definition of
business cycles excludes low frequency, one-of-a-kind events. This is a very different definition
than that used by many economists, and also by the NBER: Many aggregate fluctuations are
due to one-of-a-kind events like the 1970’s oil shocks, which nevertheless may be softened by
appropriate macro policies.
Our model shows that the potential social marginal product of advances in business cycle
theory — broadly conceived — is large. The important open question is how much individual
risk aggregate policy can remove. For addressing it, the work of Beaudry and Pages (2001) and
Atkeson and Phelan (1994) seems an interesting starting point. Even assuming no correlation
between aggregate and idiosyncratic risk, our baseline scenario shows it is important to know
how much stabilization policy can affect the permanent component of aggregate risk; perhaps
a model with endogenous growth, in which high frequency fluctuations have permanent effects,
can throw light on this.
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Appendix A. A model with Uninsurable Individual Risk
Consider a standard finance model, an exchange economy with a single non-durable consumption good and two traded assets, a risk-free discount bond and a risky equity. Bonds
are issued at time t − 1, matured at t, and each bond has a par value of one. We assume the
bond is in zero net supply. The risky equity (whose net supply we normalize to be one) pays
dividend Dt and has ex-dividend price Pt . Each consumer i is endowed with labor income
Iti and consumes Cti at time t. Aggregate labor income is It , and aggregate consumption is
Ct = It + Dt . It is assumed that It + Dt > 0 for all times t. There is an infinite set of distinct
consumers denoted by A. At time t, consumer i holds a portfolio of shares of the risky asset
θti and of the bond bit . The time t budget constraint is:
(10)

i
Cti + θti Pt + bit ≤ Iti + θt−1
(Pt + Dt ) + bit−1 Rtf ,

where Rtf denotes the return on a bond issued at t − 1. Consumers have homogeneous preferences represented by a time-separable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function with constant relative risk aversion coefficient γ and a constant subjective discount factor β. At time
0, each consumer maximizes

 P∞ t i 1−γ
t=0 β (Ct )
| F0
(11)
E
1−γ
subject to the sequence of budget constraints (10) by choosing a sequence (θi , bi , C i ) ≡
(θti , bit , Cti ), t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
An equilibrium is a security price and bond return process (P, Rf ), and strategies {(θi , bi , C i ) :
i ∈ A} for the consumers such that
(i) (θi , bi , C i ) maximizes
(10)
P (11) subject toP
(ii) markets clear, i.e., i∈A θti = 1 and i∈A bit = 0 for all t.
P
Market clearing implies that i∈A Cti = Ct ≡ It + Dt for all t.
An equilibrium price process for the risky asset will satisfy the following condition for all
i ∈ A:
" 
#
i −γ
Ct+1
(12)
Pt = E β
(Pt+1 + Dt+1 )|Ft ,
Cti
where the expectation is taken conditional on Ft , the information set at time t.
Labor income (Iti in (10)) is defined by
Iti = δti Ct − Dt
The process δti is the following martingale:
( t 
)
X
ys2
i
i
,
δt = exp
ηs ys −
2
s=1

where yt is the cross sectional standard deviation of consumption growth, and it depends on
aggregates at t. The aggregates (Ct , yt2 ) are determined first, then the idiosyncratic shocks
ηti are handed out, where ηti is assumed to be standard normal N (0, 1). With this income
process agents do not find it useful to trade in stocks nor bonds: the two instruments do not
provide insurance against the martingale shocks to income. Constantinides and Duffie (1996)
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show the existence of a no-trade equilibrium for this labor income process, i.e. each agent just
consumes his income (C i = Dt + Iti = δ i Ct ). Individual consumption growth then is:
i
i
δt+1
Ct+1
Ct+1
1 2
Ct+1
i
=
= exp{ηt+1
yt+1 − yt+1
}
.
i
i
2
Ct
Ct
δt Ct

(13)

Therefore, given normality of ηti ,
2
yt+1



= Var log



i /C
Ct+1
t+1
Cti /Ct



,

i.e., yt2 is the cross sectional variance of consumption growth.
Appendix B. Solving for ∆ with Uninsurable Individual Risk
We derive the welfare gain for the general case in which (1 − φL) ln Ct = µ + δt + σηt . From
the left hand side of (3), multiply and divide by (C0i )1−γ :
 i 1−γ
∞
∞
X
X



i
1−γ
t Ct
i
1−γ
E0 β t exp (1 − γ)cit − ci0 .
=
[C
(1
+
∆)]
E0 β
[C0 (1 + ∆)]
0
i
C0
t=0
t=0

The generic element in the sum can be written as
(
)
(
)
t
t
X
X
t
i
t
i
i
E0 β exp (1 − γ)
∆cs = E0 β exp (1 − γ)(ln Ct − ln C0 ) + (1 − γ)
(ln δs − ln δs−1 )
s=1

(

= E0 β t exp (1 − γ)(ln Ct − ln C0 ) + (1 − γ)

s=1
t
X
s=1

)
1
(ηsi ys − ys2 ) ,
2

where the last equality is obtained using the definition of δti .
Making use of the law of iterated expectations
(
)
t
t
X
X
1
(ηsi ys − ys2 ) =
gs + (1 − γ)
E0 β t exp (1 − γ)
2
s=1
s=1
)
##
"
(
)
"
(
t
t
X
X
1 2
t
i
E0 β exp (1 − γ)
gs E0 exp (1 − γ)
(ηs ys − ys ) |g1 , . . . , gt , y1 , . . . , yt .
2
s=1

s=1

ηsi

Given that the
are normally distributed, i.i.d. variables, we can compute the expectation
conditional on g1 , . . . , gt , y1 , . . . , yt .18 The expectation
"
(
)
#
t
X
1
(14) E0 exp (1 − γ)
(ηsi ys − ys2 ) |g1 , . . . , gt , y1 , . . . , yt =
2
s=1
)
(
t
X
1
2
ys .
(γ − 1)γ
exp
2
s=1

18Recall that if ln X is distributed as N (µ, σ 2 ), EeX = e µ+0.5σ2 .
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Therefore the generic element
"
(
)#
t
X
(15) E0 β t exp (1 − γ)
∆cis
=
s=1

E0

"

(

t

X
1
β exp (1 − γ)(ln Ct − ln C0 ) + (γ − 1)γ
ys2
2
t

s=1

)#

.

Notice that we can compute this expectation for all t, as it is the mean of a log-normally
distributed random variable.19
Under the random walk, this yields:
(16)




 1

1 2 2 t
2
2
,
A ≡ β exp (1 − γ)µ + αy + [(1 − γ)σ + αbσ] + α σu
2
2
t

where α = 21 γ(γ − 1). Notice this function is increasing and convex in y 2 and b if γ ≥ 1. This
implies that the welfare function ∆ will be increasing and convex in y 2 and b.
For the economy without aggregate fluctuations, the generic element in the sum will be:


1 2 2
1 2
2
′
(17)
A ≡ β exp (1 − γ)(µ + σ ) + αy + α σu .
2
2
With trend stationary consumption, the expectation is,





1 2 2 1 2 2 2 t
1
2
2 2
2
A(t) ≡ β exp{(1 − γ)µ + αy + α σu + α b σ } × exp
(1 − γ) σ + αbσ (1 − γ)
2
2
2



1
2 2
2
(1 − γ) σ + αbσ (1 − γ)
≡ AT S exp
2
And for the economy without aggregate fluctuations,


1 2 2 t
1
′
2
A (t) ≡ β exp{(1 − γ)µ + αy + α σu } exp{ (1 − γ)σ 2 }.
2
2

Appendix C. Other Parameterizations and Asset Prices
Since the problem of pricing risky assets is closely related to the question of assessing the costs
of instability, it is useful to calibrate our model so that it meets some minimal requirement
for consistency with stock market observations. This minimal requirement is the Hansen and
Jagannathan bound (1991), which says that the maximal Sharpe ratio of an economy should
be greater than or equal to the largest observed Sharpe ratios (such as the one on the S&P
500).20
In Table 5, we calculate the measure ∆ for a set of parameters θ and θ′ consistent with the
Hansen and Jagannathan bound. As well known in the asset pricing literature, this typically
19Make the substitution X = (1 − γ)(ln C − ln C ) +
t
0

1
(γ
2

− 1)γ

Pt

s=1

ys2 , and use the result of footnote

above.
20The Sharpe ratio of a risky asset s is defined as the excess return per unit of volatility, E (Rs
t
t+1 −
f
f
s
is the return on asset s, and Rt+1
is the return on the risk free asset. The maximal
Rt+1 )/σ(Rt+1 ), where Rt+1
Sharpe ratio is the maximum Sharpe ratio that a model can generate.
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involve relative risk aversion values greater than 4. Our values of γ are on the high end of
plausible values, but are not extreme and some estimates do exceed 10.21
Table 5. Welfare Gain from Removing Consumption Fluctuations
Welfare Measure
∆100%
∆70%
∆50%
∆30%
∆10%

γ = 10
γ=7
γ=5
y 2 = .0612 y 2 = .102 y 2 = .1362
0.074
0.036
0.023
0.069
0.033
0.021
0.059
0.028
0.017
0.043
0.019
0.012
0.018
0.08
0.004

Notes: γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and y 2 is the cross sectional variance of consumption growth. Pairings of (γ, y 2 ) are chosen to match the Sharpe Ratio of the S&P 500. Thus the
right panel presents results for lower values of risk aversion using the intermediate level of average
cross sectional standard deviation, y = 10%. ∆X% means that only X% of variation in ηt is removed.

We pair γ = 10, 7, and 5 with y 2 = 0.00372, 0.01, and 0.0184 respectively so that higher
levels of risk aversion are paired with lower levels of idiosyncratic risk. These levels of variance
correspond to standard deviations of 6.1%, 10%, and 13.6% respectively. As shown in De Santis
(2005), these parameterizations can generate a low risk-free interest rate (1.4%) and the high
Sharpe ratio observed for the S&P 500. The intuition is that, when there are permanent
idiosyncratic shocks, the precautionary saving motive is strong, which resolves the risk free
rate puzzle and generates a high price of risk (the maximal Sharpe ratio).
As before, b = 0 —cross sectional dispersion independent of aggregate shocks— and values
of σu are chosen so that with 99% probability the cross-sectional variance yt2 lies between zero
(absence of heterogeneity) and 2 y 2 . In the extreme case in which y 2 = 0.0184, the standard
deviation of consumption growth will be between 0 and 19% with 99% probability.22
With a risk aversion coefficient γ = 10 and cross-sectional variance equal to (6.1%)2 , we
obtain a welfare gain of 1.8% by removing only 10% of aggregate variation. The gain when
γ = 5 and only 10% of aggregate fluctuations are removed is 0.4%. Notice that the welfare
gain is not always greater than in Table 2.

21See for example Parker and Julliard (2005).
22Storesletten et al. model y 2 as two state Markov process, and find that the high variance is 21%. Our

value is not only lower, but much less frequent.
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